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Abstract: 
We estimate monetary policy rules for six central and eastern European countries (CEEC) 
during the period, when they prepared for membership to the EU and monetary union. By 
taking changes in the policy settings explicitly into account and by introducing several new 
methodological features we significantly improve estimation results for monetary policy rules 
in CEEC. We find that in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland the focus of the interest 
rate setting behaviour switched from defending the peg to targeting inflation. For Slovakia, 
however, there still seemed to be on ongoing focus on the exchange rate. For Slovenia and 
only after a policy switch for Romania we find a solid relation with inflation as well.   
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Monetary Policy Rules in Central and Eastern European 
Countries: Does the Exchange Rate Matter? 
 
1. Introduction  
Monetary policy in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) has drawn 
increasing attention from academics and practitioners. While preparing for membership to the 
EU and monetary union, the central banks in CEEC were challenged by high inflation in the 
earlier periods and then managed to disinflate fairly successfully. The way how this was 
achieved, however, was different: The Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia) focused on exchange rate targeting during the first years, but then gradually 
made their exchange rate system more flexible and adopted inflation targeting as their 
monetary policy strategy. Romania and Slovenia never officially had a fixed exchange rate 
regime. While Romania adopted inflation targeting only in August 2005, Slovenia officially 
followed a monetary targeting strategy for most of the time before adopting a two-pillar-like 
strategy in the run-up to monetary union (for the official exchange rate and monetary policy 
regimes of these six countries see Table 1 and 2).  
For these six countries the interest rate setting behaviour of a central bank can provide 
important insights into the objectives which are most important in its conduct of monetary 
policy. A standard approach is to estimate a Taylor-like interest rate reaction function. While 
the empirical literature concludes that the monetary policy by most successful central banks in 
large industrial countries can be described by such a reaction function (Clarida et al. 1998), 
evidence for emerging economies and particularly transition economies is poor. 
Regime shifts, however, seem to matter. Kahn and Parrish (1998), for example, find that 
significant structural breaks in the monetary policy reaction function occurred, after New 
Zealand and the UK introduced inflation targeting. In both countries the significance of the 
exchange rate lost importance. Neumann and von Hagen (2002) find the same result for a 
larger country set. Assenmacher-Wesche (2006) estimates reaction functions with time-
varying coefficients for Germany, the United Kingdom and the US. These empirical results 
stress the importance of taking policy changes into account.  
Since CEEC are small open economies, one may also argue that besides regime shifts 
also the exchange rate plays a major role in the reaction function. Ball (1999) argues that pure 
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inflation targeting without explicit attention to the exchange rate is dangerous in an open 
economy, because it creates large fluctuations in exchange rates and output. In an open 
economy, the effects of exchange rates on inflation through import prices is the fastest 
channel from monetary policy to inflation, therefore monetary policy cannot neglect it. The 
need for considering the exchange rate will be obvious if the monetary authorities explicitly 
target the exchange rate, as they (initially) did in many CEEC. However, the way the 
exchange rate enters the reaction function should be different under exchange rate targeting. 
Under an exchange rate peg monetary policy has to react on potential violations of the peg to 
keep it credible. Thus the reaction is non-linear, as it will get stronger, the closer the exchange 
rate approaches the intervention margins. It will also be non-discretionary, because the 
authorities are obliged to react, as long as they intent to sustain the peg. 
In line with e.g. Peersman and Smets (1999) our emphasis is on positive or descriptive 
rather than normative aspects of policy analysis. We analyse the role of the exchange rate by 
looking at the interest rate setting behaviour of the central bank and to what extent it has taken 
exchange rate developments into account. The paper thereby sheds some light on the 
discussion to which extent the interest setting behavior of these central banks complies with 
the “fear of floating” hypothesis, as analyzed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002).1 A central bank 
that changes interest rates systematically in response to inflation and also to exchange rate 
shocks is more likely to support evidence on this hypothesis keeping in mind, that the central 
bank nevertheless still may use interventions in the foreign exchange market as an instrument 
to steer the exchange rate.  
This paper adds to the literature in five ways: First, our analysis covers a longer sample 
period than most previous studies. We cover a considerable part of the transition period from 
the mid-nineties to the present or until the country joined the euro area. Second, whereas most 
works only include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and sometimes Slovakia, we add 
Slovenia and Romania to the sample. Thus we consider all new EU member states in CEEC 
which one may assume to have pursued a more or less independent monetary policy during a 
considerable period of time2. Third, the analysis takes explicitly into account shifts in 
exchange rate and monetary policy regimes that have occurred in all the countries of the 
sample. Fourth, we introduce a non-linear measure of distance to the intervention margins to 
                                                 
1
 For Central and Eastern European countries, for example, Schnabl (2004), for the credibility of exchange rate 
regimes see also Frömmel and Schobert (2006) or Fidrmuc and Horvath (2008).  
2
 This is not the case for the remaining CEEC that joined EU: The Baltic states and Bulgaria followed very strict 
exchange rate regimes and partially currency boards. This means they could not pursue an independent monetary 
policy. 
 4 
identify those interest rate changes that stem from the peg. To our knowledge we are the first 
taking this into account. Fifth, we apply the cointegration methodology to interest rate rules as 
suggested by Gerlach-Kristen (2003), which has rarely been applied to transition economies. 
These innovations allow us to retrieve more realistic coefficients from our reaction function, 
and thus our model better describes the interest rate setting behaviour of the monetary 
authorities. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The following section 2 reviews the research on interest 
rate rules in transition economies. Section 3 introduces our empirical approach and our 
distance measure. Section 4 describes the data and presents the empirical results, while 
section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Monetary policy  rules in CEEC 
The Taylor rule, first proposed in 1993, suggests that interest rates would be changed 
according to the deviation of inflation from a target and an output gap (Taylor, 1993). Other 
studies often focus on the comparison of the actual setting of policy rates by central banks 
with what would have been predicted by the Taylor rule as a benchmark. However, as 
Peersman and Smets (1999) among others emphasize, the Taylor rule should be perceived as 
a descriptive instrument to understand the interest rate setting behaviour of central banks 
rather than as a normative guide for monetary authorities. The empirical literature on such 
interest rate rules for industrial countries has grown significantly during the past decade and 
has proven the ability of interest rate rules to describe the interest rate setting behaviour of 
central banks3.  
In contrast, research in the context of emerging market economies and particularly 
transition economies is of more recent origin and relatively scarce. An important finding is 
that central banks in emerging market economies tend to look beyond inflation and focus on 
other objectives as well, most prominently on exchange rate changes. Mohanty and Klau 
(2004) find that many central banks in their sample of emerging market economies change 
interest rates systematically in response to exchange rate changes. For some countries the 
response is even found to be stronger than that to the inflation rate or the output gap.  
                                                 
3
 For monetary policy rules in the context of inflation targeting see Neumann and von Hagen (2002) and the 
references therein. 
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There are few papers on monetary policy rules particularly in CEEC. This is due to 
several reasons. First, the time series available are comparatively short. They usually start in 
the middle of the 1990s. Second, most CEEC have not followed one single strategy of 
monetary policy and also gradually made their exchange rates more flexible (see Tables 1 and 
2). Third, it is not quite clear which target values for inflation the CEEC followed, as most 
countries introduced inflation targeting and explicit inflation goals only between 1997 and 
2001. The unstable and dynamic economic situation in the CEEC makes this task even more 
demanding. 
However, there have been recently some attempts to describe the monetary policy in 
selected CEEC using interest rate rules: Maria-Dolores (2005) estimates Taylor rules for the 
Visegrad countries Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia between 1998 and 2003 
and comes to the conclusion that the Taylor rule describes the interest rates well for all 
countries but Slovakia. Similarly to the original Taylor rule, the rules used by Maria-Dolores 
(2005) do not consider exchange rate movements. The lagged interest rate, however, is 
included. The same set of countries is considered by Paez-Farell (2007), whereas the sample 
periods differ from country to country. He compares different versions of interest rate rules 
and finds that there is a reaction to exchange rate movements. Angeloni et al. (2007) estimate 
interest rate rules for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland from 1995-2004. They 
introduce the US dollar interest rate as a proxy for inflationary pressures of global origin and 
dummies for the years preceding the adoption of inflation targeting. Yilmazkuday (2008) 
applies Taylor rules to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for the period 1994-2007. He 
includes the exchange rate in the interest rate rule, but also considers structural breaks. Moons 
and Van Poeck (2008) focus on the period 1999-2003 and find that the accession countries do 
not differ substantially from the current EMU members with respect to the interest rate setting 
behaviour. Furthermore it seems that the potential new entrants have witnessed a notable 
tendency for increased convergence during the last years. Finally, Horváth (2009) analyzes 
the policy neutral rate in the Czech Republic from 2001 to 2006 using a time-varying 
parameter model with endogenous regressors. The results indicate that the policy neutral rate 
decreases gradually over the course of the sample period showing a substantial interest rate 
convergence to levels comparable to the euro area.  
All of these studies conclude that a Taylor-like rule is helpful in understanding monetary 
policy of the CEEC. However, in most cases inflation coefficients are found to be far below 
unity, thus violating the so-called Taylor principle. If the Taylor principle holds, the policy 
rate should move more than one-for-one with increases in the inflation rate and thereby raises 
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the real interest rate. If the monetary policy rule violates the Taylor principle, it will mean that 
the central bank does not react adequately on bringing down inflation.4 This result is 
counterintuitive as the CEEC have experienced a remarkable degree of disinflation during the 
last 15 years. The literature suggests mainly two explanations: Angeloni et al. (2007) argue 
that part of the reaction on inflation is captured by the coefficient on the US interest rate 
included in their equation. An increase in global inflation would then lead to a composed 
reaction, which is partly due to domestic inflation via the conventional inflation coefficient 
and partly due to foreign inflation via the coefficient on the foreign interest rate. One might 
similarly argue that the exchange rate included in the interest rate rule partially takes the 
reaction on inflation, as it anchors expectations on future monetary policy. Another argument, 
proposed by Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) is that the reaction to an increase in inflation may be 
modest, if the initial interest rate compared to inflation was set high enough. Thus a smaller 
coefficient means that in the course of the disinflation process monetary policy is getting even 
more aggressive. The scenario seems to be well applicable to the CEEC. However, one would 
at least expect the inflation coefficient to be close to unity during periods of autonomous 
monetary policy. 
Besides the above mentioned empirical research, the treatment of exchange rate changes 
in monetary policy rules is also discussed in the theoretical literature. Svensson (2000) 
compares strict inflation targeting (when stabilizing inflation around the inflation target is the 
only objective for monetary policy) with flexible inflation targeting (when there are additional 
objectives for monetary policy). His results also indicate that strict inflation targeting implies 
a vigorous use of the direct exchange rate channel for stabilizing (CPI-) inflation at a short 
horizon. In contrast, flexible inflation targeting ends up stabilizing inflation at a longer 
horizon, and thereby also stabilizes real exchange rates and other variables to a significant 
extent. In comparison with the Taylor rule, the reaction function under inflation targeting in 
an open economy responds to more information, in particular to foreign disturbances. The 
particular importance of the exchange rate for monetary policy rules in the case of emerging 
economies is also stressed by Amato and Gerlach (2002). 
Taylor (2001) argues that a monetary policy rule that reacts directly to the exchange 
rate, as well as to inflation and output, sometimes works worse than policy rules that do not 
react directly to the exchange rate and thereby avoid more erratic fluctuations in the interest 
rate. In Taylor (2002), however, he points out that monetary policy in open economies is 
                                                 
4
 For a more detailed discussion of the Taylor principle see Woodford (2001). 
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different from that in closed economies. Open-economy policymakers seem averse to 
considerable variability in exchange rate. In his view they should target a measure of inflation 
that filters out the transitory effects of exchange rate fluctuations and they should also include 
the exchange rate in their policy reaction functions. He leaves open to further research, 
whether the exchange rate should appear on the left- or the right-hand side of the rule – that 
is, whether the policy instrument should be an interest rate or rather a monetary condition 
index.  
 
3. Methodology  
Following Taylor's (1993) seminal paper, it has become common to describe monetary 
policy by a linear feedback rule linking the interest rate to the output and inflation gap.  
 
***
tttt yri βαpipi +++=  (1) 
where i is the short-term nominal interest rate set by the central bank, r* the assumed 
equilibrium real interest rate, pi the actual rate of inflation, pit* the deviation of the actual 
inflation rate from the (central bank's) target rate and yt* the percent deviation of real GDP 
from its target, the output gap. The condition α>1, known as the Taylor principle, implies that 
the nominal interest rate is moved in response to an increase in inflation sufficiently to raise 
the real interest rate.  
In line with Taylor (2002) we apply a monetary policy rule for open economies, which 
takes into account the role of the exchange rate. We modify this approach and model the 
exchange rate component with two variables: ∆st representing the growth rate of the exchange 
rate for the whole sample period, and bt, reflecting the exchange rates' position in the band, if 
the currency is pegged to an anchor currency.  
 tttttt bsyri γδβαpipi +∆++++= ***  (2) 
To model the impact of the exchange rate we thus use two different tools. On the one 
hand we use a more general instrument, the growth rate of monthly exchange rates,  which we 
can apply both for all the countries in our set and for the whole sample period. This can be 
seen as a proxy for the central banks desire to smooth exchange rate fluctuations. One would 
then expect the interest rate to be raised if the domestic currency depreciates. We use the 
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bilateral exchange rate versus the Euro (before 1999: Deutsche mark) to measure these 
effects5.  
On the other hand, as an extra feature for the countries that have explicitly pegged their 
currency during the earlier periods, we use the band distance at which the market rates are 
located from either band edge. This measure reflects pressure on the exchange rate, as every 
time the market rate tends to or actually does exceed one of the borders the central bank is 
obliged to react by interventions and/or interest rate changes. This implicates that there should 
be a strong influence of the band distance on the interest rate stance of the monetary policy.  
Since one would expect a non-linear reaction – the closer the exchange rate approaches 
the intervention margins the stronger the central bank should react – we do not calculate a 
simple distance (respectively market rate minus strong edge and weak edge minus market 
rate), but transform the distance by an exponential function. Thus, our band distance measure 
is therefore: 
                                                                             if  
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                             if                                                     (3)   
 
with l the lower boundary of the band (the strong edge), u the upper boundary of the 
band (the weak edge) and st the exchange rate. The boundaries used for the calculation are the 
official bands set by the monetary authorities. The creation of "artificial" central parities and 
boundaries for periods of official flexible exchange rate regimes but implicit fixed regimes in 
contrast would be somehow arbitrary. For most countries there are significant changes over 
time as often either the bandwidth changed or the basket of currencies used as reference was 
altered. For the purpose of illustration we show the evolution of the band distance variable 
over time (Figure 1 and 2) as an example respectively for Hungary (crawling peg) and the 
Czech Republic (horizontal peg). Two interesting features stand out. First, the exchange rates 
of Central and Eastern European countries often have had appreciating pressure during fixed 
regimes and therefore, were close to the strong edge of the narrow bands (see Figure 1 and 2). 
Second, the values increase dramatically during times of crises, when boundaries are reached 
or exceeded (see Figure2).  
                                                 
5
 We also included real and nominal effective exchange rates, this does, however, not substantially change the 
results.  
=tb
[ ])exp(),exp(max tt suls −−
[ ])exp(),exp(max tt suls −−−
)exp()exp( tt suls −>−
)exp()exp( tt suls −<−
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The consideration of the exchange rate, can be interpreted as an implicit application of 
the logic behind the ‘Tinbergen rule’, stating that one can only satisfy as many objectives as 
instruments are available. Taylor type rules show in a condensed form how central banks try 
to reconcile different objectives for inflation, output and exchange rates with only one single 
instrument, the interest rates. The respective coefficients thus reflect the preference that the 
monetary policy has towards the different goals, but are also heavily affected by the general 
environment and more precisely the amount, gravity and nature of shocks hitting the 
economy. Because country specific monetary transmission mechanisms influence the 
coefficients as well, Carare et al. (2005) warn against the comparison of coefficient between 
different countries.  
Thus, we expect that monetary policy in CEEC should exhibit different coefficients over 
time, reflecting the evolution of exchange rate and monetary policy regimes: The initially 
tight exchange rate pegs should then be reflected by a focus on the band distance, combined 
with a limited ability to directly target inflation. Schnabl (2008) demonstrates a strong link 
between exchange rate stability and growth rates for the CEEC during this episode, thus 
motivating policy actions beyond direct interventions on the exchange rate market. This 
changes when the pegs are abolished and the central banks focus more on inflation. There 
could nevertheless still be some monitoring of the exchange rate, which should be reflected 
by the smoothing element. Moreover the weight for output depends on the nature of the 
shocks and the room that the inflation target policy has left for any output goals. 
In our analysis we do not include the lagged interest rate as a smoothing component. 
Traditional explanations for smoothing interest rate changes include, for example, fear of 
disrupting capital markets, loss of credibility from sudden large policy reversals or the need 
for consensus building to support a policy change (Clarida et al., 1998). Although these 
aspects seem intuitively appealing, we feel that this approach rather entails an econometric 
solution in order to get meaningful results in an environment which suffers gravely from 
autocorrelation. Instead we find it more appealing to confront these problems directly, in a 
generalized least squares framework. According to Rudebush (2002), who states that a Taylor 
rule with smoothing generates more interest rate predictability than can be found in the data, 
the increase in predictability by adding lagged interest rates may indicate inconsistency 
between the rule and the data. 
Whereas the variables in the monetary policy rules are often treated as stationary, we 
follow Gerlach-Kristen (2003) and apply the cointegration methodology. We do this for 
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several reasons: The treatment of the variables as stationary is often regarded as a critical 
assumption. Phillips (1986) claims that, if the variables are (nearly) integrated of order one, 
static regressions in levels are likely to produce spurious results. In this respect Rudebush 
(2002) shows that such static regressions display an R-square far larger than the Durbin 
Watson statistic, which may hint at a spurious regression. Therefore, results from monetary 
policy rules in levels are often regarded as doubtful (Carare et al. 2005). Gerlach-Kristen 
(2003) states that while interest rates, inflation gap and output gap are likely to be stationary 
in large samples, in order to draw correct statistical inference it is desirable to treat them as 
non stationary in relative short samples6. 
We apply various unit root tests (Said and Dickey 1984, Kwiatkowski et al. 1992 and 
Perron 1989) to the data. The latter is less sensitive to structural breaks. The results suggest 
that interest and inflation rates are integrated of order one, whereas the output gap, the 
exchange rate growth and the band distance can be treated as stationary. However, any results 
should be carefully interpreted, taking into account that the sample size is small.  
To test for a cointegration relation between the variables we first perform a residual 
based (Augmented Dickey-Fuller cointegration) test where critical values of the cointegration 
tests are found in MacKinnon (1991). In addition we use the Johansen cointegration test on a 
system with a lag length of four. We evaluate the trace and the maximum eigenvalue statistics 
with critical values based on MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999). We include all variables 
when testing for cointegration, because although it is less common to use stationary and non-
stationary data in the same analysis, Johansen and Juselius (1992) recommend this approach, 
if the inclusion of stationary data improves the power of the cointegration test7.Both tests 
strongly point towards a cointegrating relation between the variables, which is important for 
the long run relations of our model. As means of robustness the results are confirmed by a 
Markov switching-residual based cointegration test (Gabriel et al, 2002), which can take into 
account more than one switch in the parameters. 
In line with Gerlach-Kristen (2003) we do not estimate the full error-correction model, 
but instead focus on the single-equation approach discussed by Hamilton (1994).  
                                                 
6
 See also empirical work: Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2005) estimate a monetary model of the exchange rate for the 
same six CEEC as in our study from 1994-2002 using cointegration  In the same way Fidrmuc (2009) 
demonstrates for the same CEEC from 1994-2003 that money demand and all related variables are non-
stationary and thus again apply cointegration techniques. This is however less common for Taylor rules.  
7
 We would like to thank a referee for clarifying this point. For the sake of brevity we do not report the various 
unit root and cointegration tests here. They are available from the authors on request. 
 11 
Even though cointegration yields results that are superconsistent, in small samples there 
may still occur a potential endogeneity bias. Hamilton postulates we can correct for this by 
including past and future changes of the included variables. We get the following form of the 
Taylor rule (where we also include the disturbance term ηt): 
tktbkktskkt
k
ykktkttttt bsybsyci ηγδβpiαγδβαpi pi +∆+∆+∆+∆++∆+++= +++
−=
+∑ )( 2
1
1
** (4) 
As the differences included in equation (4) only serve as a correction, we refer to the 
most important first part of the regression in what follows8. This analysis, similar to a 
dynamic OLS technique, is attributed to the seminal work of Stock and Watson (1993). 
Estimating equation (4) for the whole sample period is, however, meaningless, since the 
monetary policy rule is likely to substantially differ across subperiods. We therefore introduce 
dummy variables and let the coefficients for the different variables be time-varying, so that 
we can differentiate between the fixed and the flexible period. We also build in a dummy 
variable to catch any changes in the intercept. In this sense the outer framework remains the 
same and the comparability between periods improves. The above tests for cointegration also 
show that it is justified to use such a combined framework, because even though the 
parameters may have shifted over time, the variables involved still show a meaningful relation 
in the long run, so we can seamlessly join in with the growing literature on time-varying 
cointegration relations. This fragmentation of our sample in two separate periods gives us 
additional insight in the ‘fear of floating hypotheses’ (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). It allows us 
to examine whether central banks in CEEC were setting interest rates during officially 
flexible exchange rate regimes by still paying some attention to the exchange rate. 
The regime switches are defined as the dates when a narrow exchange rate band is 
widened to ±15% or completely abolished, according to the official exchange rate regime.9 
We regard a ±15% band as wide enough in order not to prevent seriously a central bank from 
performing an autonomous monetary policy. This is in line with the observation that some of 
the countries (namely Hungary) announced inflation targeting in combination with such wide 
bands. The choice is also supported by the empirical observation that the band distance turns 
out to be close to zero for the periods with a ±15% band (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
8
 The number of leads and lags of these elements is set to one following the structure set out in Gerlach-Kristen 
(2003). We thus get a unified framework which would not possible if we would go into individual criteria 
testing, which we do not deem necessary as it only concerns auxiliary terms. 
9
 We retrieve the following dates: For the Czech Republic we find 27/05/1997 (managed float), Hungary 
1/05/2001 (±15% band), Poland 25/03/1999 (±15% band) and Slovakia 1/10/1998 (managed float). 
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We thus determine the date of the regime switches by focusing on the exchange rate 
regime as given in table 2, instead of the monetary policy changes as given in table 110. This 
is motivated by the crucial role the exchange rate arrangements played during the first part of 
the transition period. 
Slovenia and Romania, however, never announced any official fixed exchange rate 
arrangement so we have to apply a slightly different approach. For Romania we rely on the 
classification by Frömmel and Schobert (2006) and set the shift date to 31/12/1998. For 
Slovenia, Frömmel and Schobert (2006) find evidence for an implicit crawling band exchange 
rate regime before ERM2 membership. After joining ERM2, the implicit crawling band 
changed to an explicit horizontal band. Due to its wide margins we regard it as a shift to an 
(almost) floating exchange rate regime.  
Since we only distinguish between fixed and flexible exchange rates and since the de 
facto regime switches might differ from the official ones, we tested several alternative break 
points around our fixed date (but also on the basis of dates retrieved through the Quandt-
Andrews breakpoint test, which also lay in the vicinity of our previous date) and we can state 
that our framework remains largely robust to the modifications.11  
Through the above discussed changes, equation (4) evolves to 
 ttttttttt bssyydci γδδββpiαpiαψ +∆+∆++++++= 2211*22*11*22*11  (5)  
 tktbkktskkt
k
ykktk bsy ηγδβpiαpi +∆+∆+∆+∆+ +++
−=
+∑ )( 2
1
1
 
where ψi is the dummy for the period i, with i=1 being the fixed exchange rate period, 
and i=2 the period with flexible exchange rate arrangement and (for most countries) inflation 
targeting. 
Finally we use a GLS approach12 to correct the standards errors for autocorrelation and 
apply a White correction for heteroskedasticity (MacKinnon and White, 1985).  
                                                 
10
 For example, Poland moved over from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting in 1998, but only moved 
to a fifteen percent peg from March 1999 onwards. Nonetheless our focus remains on the second date as the peg 
implies central bank intervention when the exchange rate violates one of its bands. So even though the focus of 
monetary policy seems to be switched to inflation, its hands may still be tied if it does not alter the peg. The 
same comment can be made for Slovakia. Although in both cases (we can conclude from our band distance 
variable that) the exchange rate troubles dwindled after the announcements of the new monetary policy. So of 
course the influence works in both ways. 
11
 The results for these alternative dates and specifications can be retrieved from the authors 
12
 We prefer the method described in Johnston and Dinardo (1997), because it gives the possibility to set up a 
full GLS model, so we do not lose any observations compared to simply transforming the variables. Deeper 
analysis of the (partial) autocorrelation function of the residuals points towards a AR(1) structure. Besides the 
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4. Data and Estimation Results  
We analyze monthly data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia that covers the period between January 1994 and August 2008 (or until the 
country joined the euro area). Our sample includes data from the IMF’s “International 
Financial Statistics” database, the OECD’s “statistical compendium”, and various central 
banks. 
For the interest rate we either implement the three month interbank rate or other money 
market rates depending on availability13.  
The inflation rate is calculated as the annual rate of change in the consumer price. 
Considering the inflation gap one has to keep in mind that all of the investigated countries are 
involved in a European integration process. Specifically for inflation this implies that these 
countries have to apply a twin inflation target. They do not only face an internal target, which 
is set by the domestic central bank, but they also have to comply with an external target which 
is embedded in the Maastricht criteria. In many publications and statements of the CEECs' 
central banks a distinct focus on the inflation differential to EU countries can be observed. 
This strengthens our beliefs that the main attention should be on the inflation gap based on the 
Maastricht criterion. On a more empirical level this intuition is supported by Siklos (2006), 
with the external European target yielding more consistent results than its internal equivalent. 
Furthermore there are several advantages in using the external criterion. First, not all of the 
countries adopted an inflation target for the whole period, thus there is only limited 
availability of internal inflation targets. Second, due to several reasons, e.g. the initially 
limited reputation of central banks or frequent changes in administered prices in CEEC or 
other shocks outside the control of the central bank, the official targets might substantially 
differ from the actual target or had to be adjusted over time. The Maastricht target, however, 
can be regarded as a medium to long-term objective of these central banks and therefore, 
seems to be a more reasonable benchmark for inflation.  
The output gap is calculated based on industrial production using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (smoothing parameter 14400). It is generally known that the calculation of the rate of 
                                                                                                                                                        
dynamic full GLS we also applied a simple OLS version and a transformed GLS estimation. The results, 
however, do not substantially differ. They are available from the authors on request. 
13
 More precisely we incorporate the three months interbank rate for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia and the money market rate for Romania and Slovenia. As a robustness check we also include various 
other short term interest rates in our analysis without any substantial change in the results. 
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potential output is a difficult task (the same applies to the natural rate of unemployment). The 
results strongly depend on the way it has been conceived. If one assumes the original series to 
exhibit a deterministic trend, a filter is the most appropriate solution, while a stochastic trend 
demands differentiation of the variable. We follow the classical Taylor rule analysis and 
calculate the output gap based on a filter14. Although one may expect to retrieve better results 
using real-time data (Orphanides 2001) this is not possible for our sample of countries, as 
internal estimates are either not available at all or not publicly available. 
As a first step we just focus on equation (4) as a simple open economy framework with 
fixed parameters over time that serves as a benchmark model. The results are reported in the 
first column of each country-specific segment of Table 3.15 However the interpretation 
demands caution as the coefficients will possibly be distorted and inconsistent due to the 
neglected structural break and the time-invariant coefficients. The long term reaction of the 
interest rate on inflation is above unity only for the Czech Republic and Slovenia, and at least 
not significantly different from 1 for Hungary. So broadly speaking we can say that three 
countries satisfy the Taylor principle. The coefficient for output seems less convincing as only 
Slovenia has a significant, but counterintuitive sign. The same applies for the exchange rate 
growth element, which solely gives meaningful results for the Czech Republic. The parameter 
which seems significant over all the (fixed exchange rate) countries is the band distance 
coefficient (although for the Czech Republic this holds for a higher level of significance). 
Only the Slovakian equation does not seem to be quite stable in this initial setting. For the 
other countries the results in this preliminary setting already depicts a relatively realistic 
picture of the monetary policy stance.16  
As a second step we add the dummy intercept and slice up the variables to mimic both 
periods more truthfully, thus estimating equation (5). The results are reported in the second 
column of each country-specific section in Table 3. It is certainly interesting to portrait the 
general features of the time varying components and intercept dummies and their overall 
impact (this applies for all countries except Slovenia, where the shift reflects a different 
episode).   
                                                 
14
 In contrast some authors prefer to work with growth rates, although this may lead to over-differentiating 
(Siklos and Wohar 2005). We also estimated the model with growth rates. This does not affect the estimation 
output. The results are available from the authors on request.  
15
 The constants are not reported as they are not easily interpretable in the cointegration based version of the 
Taylor rule and serve as an “auxiliary variable” (Gerlach-Kristen, 2003) 
16
 The Durbin-Watson statistic and the Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test indicate that the residuals do not show 
remaining autocorelation.  
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There is a substantial change in the sliced up coefficients. These differences are most 
obvious for the inflation coefficient. The number of countries satisfying the Taylor principle 
rises remarkably in the second period (inflation targeting and flexible exchange rate). This 
pattern corresponds to our expectations that the central banks had more flexibility to monitor 
the inflation target during the second period. Moreover, the band distance element seems 
quite robust for the new specification and is unambiguously significant for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia during their fixed exchange rate regimes. In contrast, 
the exchange rate changes ∆st are not significant for all countries but Slovakia. Thus, central 
banks used the interest rate instrument in order to keep the exchange rate well inside officially 
announced bands, but they hardly used this instrument in order to smooth exchange rate 
fluctuations. These relatively high coefficients for inflation during the flexible period also are 
in contrast with past studies on the same or similar countries, which find insignificant or low 
values for inflation. This is in line with the argument by Angeloni et al. (2008) that in a Tayor 
rule the reaction to inflation is partially captured by external variables (see introduction), in 
our case the band distance.  
There are similarly some alternations over time for the coefficients of the output gap and 
the exchange rate growth. But the importance of these particular elements seems to be 
generally quite low over both periods.  
As an intermediate summary we can conclude that the interest rate setting behaviour of 
the respective central banks only paid attention to the exchange rate during periods of 
officially fixed regimes. This consideration of the exchange rate is best embodied through the 
band distance. During periods of officially floating exchange rates, central banks increasingly 
took a more inflation minded approach. Slovakia is an exception as the coefficient on 
exchange rate growth is significant during its more flexible exchange rate regime. On a more 
empirical level we can also state that the new specification raises the explanatory power for 
all the countries: The R-square is comparable to specifications including the lagged interest 
rate. Therefore we can assume that our specification gives a more realistic fit of the monetary 
policy rules for these transition countries.  
In our country-specific discussion, we add alternative specifications to the equations in 
order to include more include country-specific features and in order to conduct some 
robustness checks. These results can be found in table 4. 
For the Czech Republic we build in an extra crisis dummy for the turbulent period in the 
middle of 1997 (more precisely for June). The results show that both inflation coefficients 
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become significant and there is still a substantial rise. Moreover the second period's exchange 
rate component is now correctly signed. Finally the band distance element remains robust and 
for the output values there is little change. All of these changes cause a higher R-square, 
suggesting that this may be a more accurate description. 
We test a different break date (based on the Andrews-Quandt test) for Hungary besides the 
official switch to a broad 15 percent band (in May 2001). The intuition behind this is that we 
now set the date endogenously through our data instead of imposing it externally17. The new 
break date becomes June 1999, which is quite earlier than the official date. Moreover we see a 
more distinct change in the inflation parameters, although they both remain significantly 
indifferent from unity.     
For Poland we estimate an alternative specification to assert what happens if we let our 
observations for the band distance run through for a longer period (than the officially stated 
pegged period which ends in April 2000) as we have indications that the monitoring of the 
peg went on a bit longer. Remarkably the band distance coefficient seems robust and remains 
significant.  
Romania never explicitly announced an exchange rate policy, so no official break date is 
available. Nevertheless there are good reasons to assume that a break occurred in December 
of 1998. The inflation coefficient increases for the later period.18  
For Slovakia the estimation results improve with the time varying approach, however, they 
remain quite shaky. Although the band distance element satisfies our expectations, we can not 
find any realistic inflation coefficients and the R-square is relatively low. So we feel that the 
specification may be unfit to realistically model the Slovakian data. We do not consider the 
ERM2 period for Slovakia for two main reasons: First, the period is comparatively short. 
Second, the bands in this particular setting are relatively wide. They are, according to our 
understanding, more a flexible than a fixed exchange rate system. When we add a band 
distance element specific for the ERM2 period to the regression, the coefficient is almost 
zero, which could either be due to no pressure on the Slovak koruna during this period or due 
to changes of the central parity at times of pressure. In fact, the later case is more likely as the 
central parity of the Slovak koruna was revalued twice during its ERM2 membership and 
therefore, relieved pressures from the exchange rate from hitting the strong edge of the band. 
                                                 
17
 We did this check for all the countries, but only report the results in case of a considerable effect. 
18
 For checking the robustness we shortened the sample period. This does not affect the results. 
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Similarly to Romania, the Slovenian authorities have officially announced only a managed 
floating exchange rate regime for the period before ERM2 membership. For this particular 
episode the time-varying approach does not work as there was no explicit change in the 
exchange rate regime. In contrast, we find a policy switch, when the Slovenian currency joins 
the ERM2-system. It officially was a change from a managed floating regime towards a 
comparatively flexible peg to the euro with very wide bands. Implicitly, however, it was a 
more pronounced policy shift from a de facto crawling band. So the time-varying parameters 
reflect this specific change in the coefficients.  Moreover the band distance variable in this 
setting only applies for the ERM2-period, but as there was no real trouble towards any of the 
boundaries, the coefficients are negligible and were thus not included in the estimation. As an 
alternative specification we turn our attention to the fact that Slovenia's monetary policy in 
contrast to the other countries in the sample officially focused on monetary aggregates. Until 
1997 the focus was mainly on base money and M1, but later it switched to M3 (and in 2001 
Slovenia even adopted a two pillar strategy). We build in these subperiods with several 
dummy variables and come to the following conclusion: The inflation coefficient is relatively 
stable over all periods, the output coefficients now become significant but are wrongly signed 
and the money coefficient (which refers to the money gap19) is only significant in the third 
period. This means that we can not retrieve the policy attention for monetary aggregates as it 
was officially stated. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Many central banks in emerging market economies may pay special attention to 
exchange rate movements, even though they do not officially claim to target the exchange 
rate. In order to influence exchange rate developments the central bank can use basically two 
instruments: foreign exchange interventions and interest rate changes. We focus on the later 
monetary policy instrument by estimating open-economy monetary policy rules in order to 
analyse to which extent central banks in Central and Eastern Europe have given the exchange 
rate a special role in their interest rate decisions.  
We estimate monetary policy rules based on a cointegration approach and by one has to 
consider explicitly taking into consideration shifts in exchange rate regimes. The influence of 
the exchange rate on the interest rate setting behaviour of central banks in CEEC can differ 
                                                 
19
 We also included money growth rates as an alternative, but this does not substantially alter the estimation 
output. 
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strongly between periods with different exchange rate arrangements. During periods of more 
rigid exchange rate arrangements the influence of the exchange rate dominates, i.e. the 
interest rate policy is mainly influenced by the distance to the intervention margins on which 
the central bank has to react in order to keep the peg working. During the time periods of 
more flexible exchange rate arrangements we find a stronger focus on inflation, namely, on 
the deviation of domestic inflation from the inflation rate set by the Maastricht criterion. This 
is, in particular, the case for the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania. The inflation 
coefficient for Slovenia also satisfies the Taylor principle, whereas for Hungary the 
coefficient is below, but not significantly different from unity.  
Slovakia remains a special case in the sample. The inflation coefficients do not satisfy 
the Taylor principle, and it seems that there has been an ongoing focus on exchange rate 
movements after switching from a fixed exchange rate regime to a managed float. Slovakia, 
presumably gives a case of an implicit peg and its results may reflect the discretionary stance 
of the central bank as observed by central bank members themselves.  
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Figures:  
 
FIGURE 1: Derivation of the band distance element from the historical exchange rate peg 
values for Hungary (Forint/ Deutsche Mark)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Derivation of the band distance element from the historical exchange rate peg 
values for the Czech Republic (Czech Koruna/ Deutsche Mark)  
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Tables: 
TABLE 1: Official Monetary Policy Strategies for Central and Eastern European Countries 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
1994-1997 Exchange rate and 
monetary targeting 
(credit volume and 
M2) 
1994-2002 Exchange rate 
targeting 
1994-1998 Exchange rate 
targeting  
1998-2001 Net inflation1 
targeting  
2002- Inflation targeting 
(CPI annual 
average)3 
1998- Inflation targeting 
(end of year CPI 
inflation) 
2002- Headline inflation 
targeting with linear 
and declining target 
band 
    
      
Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
1994-
7/2005 
No official 
commitment to a 
monetary policy 
strategy 
1994-1998 Exchange rate 
targeting 
1994-1995 Base money 
targeting 
8/2005-
2008 
Inflation targeting 1998-2008 Informal inflation 
targeting 
1996 Base money and 
M1-targeting 
  11/2005 – 
12/2008 
2009- 
ERM-II 
 
Euro system 
1997-2000 M3-targeting2 
    2001-2006 Two-pillar strategy4 
    06/2004 – 
12/2006 
2007- 
ERM-II 
 
Euro system 
 
1
  Headline inflation minus regulated prices and changes in indirect taxes 
2
  In Slovenia also including foreign exchange deposits of private households 
3
  Exchange rate targeting continues in a wide band (±15%) 
4
  Similar to the strategy of the European Central Bank the Bank of Slovenia bases its monetary policy indicators 
on two pillars, i.e. indicators of liquidity, and other economic indicators. 
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TABLE 2: Official Exchange Arrangements for Central and Eastern European Countries 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
01/01/1994-
29/02/1996 
Basket peg, 
65% DEM, 
35%USD, 
Band: ±0.5% 
01/01/1994-
31/12/1996 
Crawling peg1,  
70% Ecu, 
30% USD, 
Band: ±2.25% 
01/01/1994-
15/05/1995 
Crawling peg,  
45% USD, 35% 
DEM, 10% 
GBP,  
5% FRF,  
5% CHF 
Band: ±1 % 
01/03/1996-
26/05/1997 
Band: ±7.5% 01/01/1997-
31/12/1999 
70% DEM, 
30% USD 
16/05/1995-
24/02/1998 
Band: ±7% 
27/05/1997-
present 
Managed float 01/01/2000-
30/04/2001 
100% EUR 25/02/1998-
31/12/1998 
Band: ±10% 
  01/05/2001-
30/09/2001 
Band: ±15% 01/01/1999-
11/04/2000 
45% USD, 
55% EUR 
  01/10/2001-
25/02/2008 
Peg to EUR, 
Band: ±15% 
12/04/2000-
present 
Free float 
  26/02/2008-
present 
Managed float   
Romania Slovak Republic Slovenia 
since 01/01/1994 Managed float 
 
01/01/1994-
31/12/1996 
Basket peg, 
60% DEM, 
40%USD, 
Band: ±1.5% 
01/01/1994-
26/06/2004 
Managed float 
  01/01/1997-
30/09/1998 
Band: ±7% 27/06/2004-
31/12/2006 
ERM2 
  01/10/1998-
24/11/2005 
Managed float since 01/01/2007 Official Euro 
system member 
  25/11/2005-
31/12/2008 
ERM2   
  since 01/01/2009 Official Euro 
system member 
  
 
Source: IMF, Annual Report of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions, various issues 
1
 Until 16.3.1995, the NBH devalued in discrete steps 
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TABLE 3: Estimates of the cointegrating vector 
  Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland  Romania  Slovakia  Slovenia 
Coefficients 
Time-
invariant 
Time-
varying  
Time-
invariant 
Time-
varying  
Time-
invariant 
Time-
varying  
Time-
invariant 
Time-
varying  
Time-
invariant 
Time-
varying  
Time-
invariant 
Time-
varying 
  
                 
α
 π α1 π 1.133 -0.120  0.878 0.868  0.685 0.555  0.324 0.118  0.239 0.316  1.306 1.453 
  (0.000) (0.805)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.157)  (0.125) (0.527)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 α2 π - 1.021  - 0.903  - 1.134  - 1.120  - 0.344  - 1.050 
  
- (0.000)  - (0.000)  - (0.000)  - (0.000)  - (0.002)  - (0.059) 
  
    
 
            
β
 Y β1Y  -0.199 -0.093  -0.121 -0.194  0.031 0.058  -0.251 -0.940  0.303 0.118  -0.526 -0.592 
  
(0.133) (0.342)  (0.119) (0.007)  (0.666) (0.505)  (0.378) (0.150)  (0.352) (0.666)  (0.001) (0.000) 
 β2Y - -0.331  - -0.108  - 0.060  - -0.006  - -0.160  - -0.430 
  
- (0.018)  - (0.170)  - (0.465)  - (0.981)  - (0.478)  - (0.008) 
  
 
 
               
γB γB 1.628 2.619  1.072 1.695  1.325 1.381  - -  3.636 5.908  - - 
  
(0.085) (0.007)  (0.032) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.008)  - -  (0.033) (0.001)  - - 
  
                 
δ
 S δ1S 0.338 0.285  0.120 0.152  -0.015 -0.015  -0.506 0.906  1.002 1.208  0.8324 1.443 
  (0.035) (0.137)  (0.203) (0.489)  (0.044) (0.307)  (0.000) (0.554)  (0.207) (0.163)  (0.403) (0.109) 
 δ2S  - 0.243  - 0.095  - -0.000  - -0.380  - 1.245  - -3.462 
  
- (0.210)  - (0.418)  - (0.999)  - (0.093)  - (0.037)  - (0.222) 
  
                 
 ψD - -9.741  - -1.811  - -6.091  - -53.466  - -7.002  - 3.318 
  
- (0.017)  - (0.034)  - (0.000)  - (0.000)  - (0.050)  - (0.001) 
  
                 R2  0.574 0.696  0.794 0.876  0.651 0.841  0.438 0.578  0.105 0.329  0.631 0.709 
DW  1.860 1.759  1.454 1.300  1.313 0.909  1.402 1.245  2.170 1.882  2.234 2.135 
"Fixed" are the estimates for the benchmark equation (4)
tktbkktskktyk
l
k ktkttttt
bsybsyci ηγδβpiαγδβαpi pi +∆+∆+∆+∆++∆+++= +++
−=
+∑ )( 21
**
, "Variable" for equation (5) with time-
varying coefficients: 
tktbkktskktyk
l
k ktkttttttttt
bsybssyydci ηγδβpiαγδδββpiαpiαψ pi +∆+∆+∆+∆++∆+∆++++++= +++
−=
+∑ )( 212211
*
22
*
11
*
22
*
11
 P-values in parenthesis. Estimates of 
the auxiliary coefficient c not reported.
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TABLE 4: Estimates of the cointegrating vector for alternative specifications  
  
Czech R.   Hungary   Poland   Romania     Slovenia 
α1 π 0.799  0.772  0.528  0.100  α1 π 1.295 
 (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.187)   (0.000) 
α2 π 1.115  0.967  1.057  0.983  α2 π 1.083 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.002) 
β1Y  -0.125  -0.053  0.026  -1.030  β1Y  -0.628 
 (0.144)  (0.591)  (0.774)  (0.106)  
 (0.000) 
β2Y -0.166  -0.123  0.063  0.082  β2Y -0.412 
 (0.024)  (0.151)  (0.464)  (0.588)   (0.005) 
γB 1.006  1.085  1.301  -  δ1S 1.196 
 (0.041)  (0.014)  (0.009)  -   (0.292) 
δ1S 0.167  0.168  -0.103  -0.526  δ2S  0.259 
 (0.320)  (0.350)  (0.001)  (0.000)   (0.929) 
δ2S  0.251  0.137  -0.107  0.324  σ
 1M -0.395 
 (0.043)  (0.177)  (0.010)  (0.352)   (0.432) 
ψD  -1.361  -3.561  -6.683  -58.762  σ
 2M 0.278 
 (0.043)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.179) 
ψ'D  9.742  -  -  -  σ
 3M -0.219 
 (0.000)  -  -  -   (0.008) 
         
 
 
R2 0.814  0.868  0.837  0.623  R2 0.735 
DW 0.899   1.434   0.933   1.396   DW 2.052 
 
For the Czech Republic we used following specification: 
tktktbkktskktyk
l
k ktkttttttttt
bbsyssyyddci ηγγδβpiαδδββpiαpiαψψ pi +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+++++++= ++++
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We opted for the classical structure of equation (5) for Hungary, Poland and Romania, but with their country-specific 
characteristics (different dummy dates, or adjustments to the sample period). 
Finally Slovenian had following specification: 
tktbkktskktyk
l
k ktktMtMtMttttttttt
bsyMMMbssyydci ηγδβpiασσσγδδββpiαpiαψ pi +∆+∆+∆+∆++++∆+∆++++++= +++
−=
+∑ )( 213322112211
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P-values in parenthesis. 
Estimates of the auxiliary coefficient c not reported. 
